Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy by Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy 
 
 
Thomas Aronsson  
Umeå University, Sweden  
 
and 
 
Erkki Koskela 
University of Helsinki and HECER 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 269 
August 2009 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-
00014 University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781, 
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 269 
 
Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy*    
   
Abstract 
 
This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-country OLG economy, where each 
country is characterized by asymmetric information between the government and the 
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outsourcing.  The tax policy response by the government in the country that receives 
foreign production capacity is, in general, ambiguous and depends on a tradeoff between 
wage-equality and factor income from abroad. By using the non-cooperative Nash 
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1.   Introduction 
 
International outsourcing has become an increasingly important business practice, and is 
meant to imply that firms locate part of their production process in another country. 
Earlier  research  shows  that  wage  differentials  across  countries  constitute  important  
driving forces behind this behavior, as the costs will be reduced if part of the production 
is located to a country with lower wages.1 There is also empirical evidence suggesting 
that international outsourcing of production leads to more wage-inequality in the sense 
of increasing the skill-premium.2 However, despite that international outsourcing may 
deteriorate the income prospects of the low-skilled in countries that outsource 
production abroad, and despite that it may cause income redistribution and externalities 
at the international level, outsourcing has so far received very little attention in the 
literature on optimal income taxation. Two questions immediately come to mind. First, 
how would the national government, whose firms outside production abroad and whose 
objective is based on the domestic welfare, adjust its redistributive tax policy in 
response  to  international  outsourcing?  Second,  what  is  the  tax  policy  response  by  the  
government in the country that receives foreign production capacity and is also based on 
domestic welfare. Third, does this type of outsourcing justify tax policy cooperation at 
the international level? The present paper attempts to answer these two questions. The 
main purpose is to analyze how outsourcing affects the optimal income tax structure in a 
dynamic economy, where we make a distinction between, on the one hand, the country 
whose firms locate part of their production abroad and, on the other, the host-country 
that receives foreign production structure with employment opportunities for its own 
labor force. This also provides a natural framework for studying the international 
externalities that outsourcing gives rise to and, as a consequence, to analyze the welfare 
effects of policy cooperation between countries. 
                                               
1  See, e.g., Amiti and Wei (2005), Rishi and Saxena (2004) and Sinn (2007). At the same time, 
wage differentials alone may exaggerate the incentives for outsourcing due to a mismatch between 
technology and the skills of workers in less developed economies;  see, e.g., Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (2001). For an overview, see Hummels et al. (2001). 
2  See, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2003), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005), Hijzen 
(2007), Egger and Egger, (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2009), Riley and Young (2007) and 
Geishecker and Görg (2008). 
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To be able to explore the relationship between outsourcing, wage inequality and 
optimal redistributive taxation, we incorporate outsourcing into a model with two 
ability-types and asymmetric information between the government and the private 
sector. Our model is, therefore, an extension of the optimal income tax model with two 
ability-types developed in its original form by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), which is 
by now one of the major workhorses in this area. The tax instruments that each national 
government has at its disposal are nonlinear taxes of labor income and capital income, 
respectively. Such a tax system constitutes a reasonably realistic description of the 
options available for income taxation. It also implies that the appearance of tax 
distortions at the second best optimum is a consequence of optimization subject to 
informational  limitations  only;  not  any  other  restriction  such  as  the  necessity  to  raise  
revenue per se. A similar model was used by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a), although 
their  study  is  partial  in  the  sense  of  focusing  all  attention  on  the  country  whose  firms  
outsource production abroad. Furthermore, their study is based on a static model, which 
does  not  contain  capital  income taxation.  They  show that  if  the  government  is  able  to  
control the amount of resources spent on outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, then 
outsourcing will not (by itself) modify the policy rules for marginal labor income 
taxation. However, if the government lacks a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, 
then outsourcing contributes to a more progressive tax structure in the sense of 
decreasing the marginal labor income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type and 
increasing the marginal labor income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type. The 
intuition is that the income tax in this case serves as an indirect instrument to reduce the 
level of outsourcing (via the policy response just described) and, therefore, avoid part of 
the wage-inequality that outsourcing would otherwise give rise to.3 
 
                                               
3   In economies with equilibrium unemployment, outsourcing may also imply lost employment 
opportunities for the domestic labor force. Aronsson and Koskela (2009b) analyze optimal taxation 
and provision of a public input good in an economy with equilibrium unemployment (due to a 
minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type). Their results show, among other 
things, that the appearance of outsourcing provides an incentive for the government to increase the 
provision of the public input good. See also Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009), who investigate the 
consequences of outsourcing for unemployment insurance and redistributive linear taxation in an 
economy with unemployment. Wage and employment responses to labor taxation and/or specific 
labor tax reforms in economies with outsourcing and involuntary unemployment are analyzed by 
Koskela and Schöb (2008) and Koskela and Poutvaara (2008a, 2008b, 2009). Ethier (2005) 
addresses the policy tradeoff between a lower skill premium and employment among the low-
skilled in a country undertaking outsourcing. 
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Our study contributes to the literature in, at least, three ways. First, by considering 
a dynamic economy, we are able to analyze how the appearance of outsourcing modifies 
the structure of optimal capital income taxation; not just the labor income tax. As far as 
we know, there are no earlier studies dealing with the optimal mix of labor and capital 
income taxation in this particular context.4 Such  a  study  is  clearly  relevant,  as  the  
incentives for capital formation provides an additional channel via which public policy 
may influence the level of outsourcing. It also relevant as a complement to the study by 
Aronsson and Koskela (2009a) mentioned above, which only considers optimal labor 
income taxation. Second, earlier studies dealing with public policy in economies with 
outsourcing have typically focused attention on the country whose firms outsource 
production abroad; not on the host-country whose residents receive income from 
abroad.5 The present study, on the other hand, considers a two-country economy, where 
one of the countries (referred to as the North) moves part of its production to another 
country (referred to as the South). We will then characterize the optimal tax structure as 
the outcome of a noncooperative Nash game between the two national governments. 
Third, outsourcing gives rise to international externalities, which are not fully 
internalized by the policies implemented by national governments. This suggests that 
policy  cooperation  (if  properly  designed)  may  lead  to  higher  social  welfare.  We  will,  
therefore, also analyze some aspects of tax policy cooperation.6 To  the  best  of  our  
knowledge, this is a novel aspect in the literature on taxation and outsourcing. 
 
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which is an 
overlapping generations (OLG) economy with two countries, North and South, and two 
ability-types in each country, where each consumer lives for two periods. In the first 
period, the consumer works and saves; in the second, he/she is retired. In each country, 
firms produce a homogeneous good by using labor (of both ability-types) and capital. In 
                                               
4   Earlier studies on optimal nonlinear taxation in dynamic models address a variety of issues such 
as,  e.g.,  the  conditions  under  which  we  ought  to  use,  or  not  use,  capital  income  taxation  as  a  
supplement to the labor income tax in an economy with competitive markets (Ordover and Phelps, 
1979; Brett, 1997; Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2001); the consequences of equilibrium unemployment 
for optimal income taxation (Aronsson et al. 2009); and optimal income taxation in economies 
where the consumers have positional preferences (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, in press).  
5  An exception is the study by Egger and Falkinger (2006), which examines the implications of 
public infrastructure investments in a two-country economy. But in their model they use lump-sum 
taxes to finance government investments.  
6        Aronsson and Sjögren (2004) have considered coordinated policy reforms in terms of the marginal 
taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good in a right-
to-manage wage formation model in the absence of outsourcing. 
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addition, the firms in the North may also locate production activities carried out by low-
skilled labor to the South (where the before-tax wage rate is lower). To be able to 
capture  the  effects  of  outsourcing  in  a  simple  way,  we  abstract  from other  sources  of  
interaction between the countries. This simplification enables us to avoid the issue of 
tax competition for mobile production factors, which has been studied extensively in 
other literature.7 Section  3  concerns  the  optimal  tax  structure  implicit  in  a  
noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Our results show, among other things, that the 
appearance of outsourcing provides an incentive for the government in the North to 
implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher 
marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type, i.e. in this sense a more 
progressive labor income tax structure, as well as implementing higher marginal capital 
income tax rates for both ability-types than it would otherwise have done. The policy 
responses to outsourcing by the southern government are, in general, ambiguous, as the 
desire to relax the self-selection constraint counteracts the incentive to increase the 
budgetary gain of outsourcing. We also show that the appearance outsourcing extends 
the production-inefficiency arguments for capital income taxation discussed in earlier 
literature (Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001, Aronsson et al. 2009), as outsourcing affects the 
incentives for capital formation and, therefore, the wage distribution in both countries. 
 
Since the tax policy implemented by each national government in the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium directly affects the well-being of the residents in the 
other country as well, the noncooperative equilibrium is not efficient from the 
perspective of society as a whole. In Section 4, therefore, we address tax policy 
cooperation. We show how joint agreements among the countries to change the 
marginal labor and/or capital income tax rates can be designed to increase the welfare. 
The results are summarized and discussed in Section 5. 
 
2.    The Model 
 
In this section, we consider an OLG economy comprising two countries, which will be 
referred to as North (n)  and  South  (s). We assume that North outsources part of its 
                                               
7          See, e.g. Wilson (1986, 1999). 
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production to South, which will be addressed more thoroughly below. Below, we 
describe the consumers and firms as well as the outcome of private optimization. 
 
2.1.   Consumers  
 
In each country, the consumers live for two periods. Following the approach in earlier 
comparable literature, we assume that the consumer works during the first period of life 
and does not work during the second. There are two types of consumers; a low-ability 
type (denoted by superindex 1) and a high-ability type (denoted by superindex 2). The 
distinction between ability-types refers to productivity, which is interpreted to mean that 
the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage rate than the low-ability type. As the 
number of individuals of each ability-type and generation is not important for our 
understanding of the optimal policy responses to outsourcing, it will be normalized to 
one in what follow. This also means that we abstract from population growth. 
 
The utility function facing ability-type i in country j born in the beginning of 
period t is given by (for 1, 2i ?  and ,j n s? ) 
 
 , , , 1 ,( , , )
i i i i
j t j t j t j tu u c x z??                                                    (1) 
 
where c denotes consumption when young, x consumption when old and z leisure when 
young (when old, all time available is used for leisure). Leisure is, in turn, defined as a 
time endowment, H, less the time spent in market work, l. 
 
Let w  and ?  denote the before-tax hourly wage rate and saving, respectively, and 
r denote the before-tax interest rate. The individual budget constraint can then be 
written as 
 
 , , , , , , ,( )
i i i i i i
j t j t j t j t j t j t j tw l T w l c?? ? ?          (2) 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1(1 ) ( )
i i i
j t j t j t j t j t j tr r x? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?          (3) 
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in which , , ,( )
i i
j t j t j tT w l  and , 1 , 1( )
i
j t j t tr?? ??  represent the labor income tax paid in period t 
and capital income tax paid in period t+1, respectively. Note that the tax functions may 
vary over time and across countries. The consumer prices are normalized to one for 
notational convenience. 
 
The first order conditions for hours of work and savings, respectively, become 
 
 ', , , , , , , ,(1 ( )) 0
i i i i i
j t c j t j t j t j t j t zu w T w l u? ? ?                              (4) 
 ', , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1[1 ( ) ] 0
i i i
j t c j t x j t j t j t j t j tu u r r r?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?        (5) 
 
where we have used , , , ,/
i i i
j t c j t j tu u c? ? ? , , , , ,/i i ij t z j t j tu u z? ? ?  and , , , , 1/i i ij t x j t j tu u x ?? ? ? . In 
equation (4), ', , ,( )
i i
j t j t j tT w l  denotes the marginal labor income tax rate, whereas 
'
, 1 , , 1( )
i
j t j t j tr?? ??  in equation (5) denotes the marginal capital income tax rate. 
 
2.2.    Production 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, we assume that each country is 
characterized by identical competitive firms producing a homogenous good under 
constant returns to scale using labor of both ability-types and capital. For notational 
convenience, we normalize the number of firms in each country to one. As we 
mentioned  above,  one  of  the  countries,  referred  to  as  North  (j=n), locates part of its 
production in the other country, referred to as South (j=s). To be more specific, we 
assume that the firms in the North partly use unskilled labor from the South in their 
production and have to pay the Southern low-skilled wage rate for their services. 
 
Production in the North 
 
By analogy to Koskela and Stenbacka (2007), the production function is written as 
1 1 2
, , , ,( , , )n n t ns t n t n tF l l l K?? , where K is the capital stock. We assume that the production 
function is increasing in each of its three arguments, and that the production factors are 
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technical complements in the sense that 1 2, 0n l lF ? , 1, 0n l KF ?  and 2, 0n l KF ? .
8 The 
variable 1 ,ns tl  is the low-skilled labor (measured in work hours) by residents in the South 
that are used by northern firms. The parameter ?  captures the idea that foreign labor 
may not be a perfect substitute for domestic labor; therefore, one would normally expect 
that 10 ?? ? . In our framework, outsourcing is substitutable for domestic unskilled 
labor and complementary with domestic skilled labor, implying that outsourcing leads 
to more wage inequality in the North. As mentioned above, this property is conformity 
with empirical evidence (see footnote 2). Ethier (2005) uses a similar production 
function  (yet  based  on  a  specific  functional  form  assumption)  to  study  the  effects  of  
globalization on the skill premium. There is also a capacity aspect of outsourcing, as the 
firm  needs  to  build  costly  capacity  abroad.  We  assume  that  while  some  activities  are  
easy to outsource, other activities are more costly. Therefore, the marginal cost of 
outsourcing increases in the scope of activities to outsource, so that there is a capacity 
cost of outsourcing, 1 ,( )ns tl? , which is increasing and convex, 
i.e. 1 1, ,'( ) 0, ''( ) 0ns t ns tl l? ?? ? . This formulation captures the idea that outsourcing may 
necessitate costly investments into the establishment of network of suppliers in relevant 
host-countries. 
 
The objective function facing the firm at any time, t, can be written as 
 
 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1, , , , , , , , , , , , ,( , , ) ( )n t n n t ns t n t n t n t n t n t t ns t s t ns t n t n tF l l l K w l w l l w l r K? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
where (as before)  1,n tw  and 
2
,n tw  denote the before-tax wage rates paid to low-skilled 
and high-skilled labor, respectively, and ,n tr  denotes the interest rate, while 
1
,s tw  is the 
before tax wage rate paid to low-skilled labor the South in period t. The first order 
conditions become 
 
 1 1 1 2 1, , , , ,, ( , , ) 0n t ns t n t n t n tn lF l l l K w?? ? ?          (6) 
                                               
8     Instead of splitting the production function into a domestic and foreign part, we simplify by 
considering a single production function for the representative firm. Given the assumptions made 
above, this is not important for the results. 
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 2 1 1 2 2, , , , ,, ( , , ) 0n t ns t n t n t n tn lF l l l K w?? ? ?                               (7) 
 1 1 2, , , , , ,( , , ) 0n K n t ns t n t n t n tF l l l K r?? ? ?                               (8) 
 1 11 1 2 1 1, , , , , ,, ( , , ) ( ) 0n t ns t n t n t ns t s tn l lF l l l K l w? ? ?? ? ? ? .        (9) 
 
By using equation (9), we can write 1 ,ns tl  as a function 
1
,n tl , 
2
,n tl , ,n tK  (variables that the 
government in the North controls via tax policy; see below) and 1,s tw , i.e., 
 
 1 1 1 2 1, , , , ,( , , , )ns t ns n t n t n t s tl l l l K w
? ? ??
?         (10) 
 
where sign-indicator above each argument shows the qualitative comparative statics 
effect. 
 
Production in the South 
 
Let 1 1 1, , ,s t ds t ns tl l l? ?  be the total labor supply in the South, where 1 ,ds tl  is the low-skilled 
labor supplied to domestic production in the southern economy. The production 
function is written as 1 1 2, , , ,( , , )s s t ns t s t s tF l l l K?  and is assumed to have the same qualitative 
properties as the production function for the North described above, i.e. 021. ?llsF , 
01. ?KlsF  and 02. ?KlsF . The objective function of the representative firm is given by 
 
 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2, , , , , , , , , , , ,( , , ) ( )s t s s t ns t s t s t s t n t sn t s t s t s t s tF l l l K w l l w l r K? ? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
The first order conditions become 
 
 1 1 1 2 1, , , , ,, ( , , ) 0s t ns t s t s t s ts lF l l l K w? ? ?        (11) 
 2 1 1 2 2, , , , ,, ( , , ) 0s t ns t s t s t s ts lF l l l K w? ? ?        (12) 
 1 1 2, , , , , ,( , , ) 0s K s t ns t s t s t s tF l l l K r? ? ? .       (13) 
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For further use, note that equations (10) and (11) implicitly define the low-skilled wage 
rate in the South as a function of the hours of work and capital stock in both countries, 
i.e. 
 
 1 1 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,( , , , , , )s t s s t s t s t n t n t n tw w l l K l l K
? ? ? ?? ?
? .       (14) 
 
The intuition behind equation (14) is straight forward. For the variables accruing to the 
South, the influence of 1,s tl  reflects a labor supply effect on the wage rate (due to 
concavity of the production function), whereas the qualitative effects of 2,s tl  and ,s tK  are 
due to complementary between, on the one hand, unskilled labor and, on the other, 
skilled labor and capital. The effects of the northern variables, 1,n tl , 
2
,n tl  and ,n tK , follow 
from the properties of the production function in the North in combination with 
equation (10) above. 
 
3.     Optimal Taxation in a Noncooperative Equilibrium 
 
In this section, we begin by a presentation of the decision-problem facing each national 
government.  We  will  then  turn  to  the  outcome  in  terms  of  optimal  taxation  of  labor  
income and capital income at the national level, in case the two national governments 
act as Nash competitors to one another. 
 
Each national government is assumed to face the following general social welfare 
function9; 
 
 1 2 1 2,0 ,0 ,1 ,1( , , , ,....)j j j j j jW W u u u u?        (15) 
 
for j=n, s, which allows for a unique welfare weight attached to the utility function of 
each ability-type and generation. 
                                               
9  Another approach would be to assume that the government aims at maximizing the utility of one 
particular ability-type and generation subject to minimum utility restrictions for all other ability-
types and generations. If we were to use this alternative approach (instead of using the social 
welfare function), all qualitative results derived below would remain unchanged. 
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The informational assumptions are conventional: the government knows the 
income of each individual as well as the number of individuals of each ability-type, 
whereas ability is private information. This means that the government is not able to 
observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or high-ability type. By concentrating 
on the “normal” case, where redistribution means income transfers from the high-ability 
to the low-ability type, one would like to prevent the high-ability type from mimicking 
the low-ability type in order to gain from redistribution. The self-selection constraint 
that may bind then becomes 
 
 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2, , , 1 , , , 1 , , ,ˆ( , , ) ( , , )j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j tu u c x z u c x H l u?? ?? ? ? ?       (16) 
 
where 2,ˆ j tu  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 
1 2
, , ,/ 1j t j t j tw w? ? ?  the wage ratio, i.e. 
the relative wage rate, in period t. Note that the mimicker faces the same income and 
consumption  point  in  both  periods  and,  therefore,  pays  as  much tax  as  the  low-ability  
type. However, as the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she 
spends more time on leisure. We can interpret 1, ,j t j tl?  as the labor that the mimicker 
needs to supply in order to reach the same income as the low-ability type. By using the 
first order conditions for the firm, the wage ratio can be written as 
 
 1 2 1, , , , ,( , , , )j t j j t j t j t ns tl l K l? ?? .         (17) 
 
For further use, note that 1, ,/ 0n t ns tl?? ? ?  and 1 1, ,/ 0s t ns tl?? ? ? . In other words, increased 
outsourcing leads to more wage inequality in the North and less wage inequality in the 
South. 10 
                                               
10        These properties are easily seen if we write the wage ratios as follows; 
 
1
,
2
,
1 1 2( , , ), , , ,1,
, 1 1 2( , , ), , , ,2,
wn t
wn t
F l l l Kn t ns t n t n tn l
n t
F l l l Kn t ns t n t n tn l
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
 
  
1
,
2
,
1 1 2( , , ), , , ,1,
, 1 1 2( , , ), , , ,2,
ws t
ws t
F l l l Ks t ns t s t s ts l
s t
F l l l Ks t ns t s t s ts l
? ? ?
?
?
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As we abstract from publicly provided goods, the resource constraint facing each 
national government can be written as 
 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1, 1 , , , , , , , , , , ,( , , )n t n t n n t ns t n t n t n t n t n t n t s t ns tK K F l l l K c c x x w l?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    (18a) 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
, 1 , , , , , , , , , , ,( , , )s t s t s s t ns t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t ns tK K F l l l K c c x x w l? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    (18b) 
 
which imply that output is used for private consumption and net investments. The final 
term on the right hand side of each resource constraint arises because outsourcing gives 
rise to an income effect, which differs between the countries. This is so because part of 
the income generated by the North accrues to residents in the South. 
 
As the nonlinear taxes on labor income and capital income analyzed here imply 
that each national government can control the domestic consumption and work hours by 
each  ability-type  as  well  as  the  domestic  capital  stock,  we  follow  the  bulk  of  earlier  
literature on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation by considering a direct 
decision-problem. The decision-problem facing each national government will be 
written such that the government chooses hours of work, consumption and capital stock 
in order to maximize the social welfare function presented in equation (15) subject to 
the self-selection constraint and the resource constraint given by equation (16) and (18), 
respectively. We can then derive the optimal marginal (labor and capital) income tax 
rates needed to implement the second best resource allocation by combining the first 
order conditions for the government with those of the private sector. 
 
3.1    Optimal Taxation in the North 
 
The optimal tax problem in the North will be written such that the government chooses 
1
,n tl , 
1
,n tc , 
1
,n tx , 
2
,n tl , 
2
,n tc , 
2
,n tx  and ,n tK  for all t  to maximize the Lagrangean 
 
                                                                                                                                          
  and then differentiate with respect to 1 ,lns t . 
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2 2 1 2 1 2 1
, , , , , , , , , ,
1 1
, , , , 1
ˆ[ ] [ ( )
]
n n n t n t n t n t n t n t n t n t n t ns t
t t
s t ns t n t n t
L W u u F c c x x l
w l K K
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
 
 
in which ,n tF  denotes the production function as specified in equation (18a) above. The 
government in the North recognizes that that 1 ,ns tl , 
1
,s tw  and ,n t?  are determined by 
equation (10), (14) and (17), respectively, while treating the decision-variables of the 
southern government (i.e. 1,s tl , 
1
,s tc , 
1
,s tx , 
2
,s tl , 
2
,s tc , 
2
,s tx  and ,s tK  for all t ) as exogenous. 
The first order conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
 
To simplify the presentation of the results, we begin by deriving the welfare effect 
for the North of a small increase in outsourcing, i.e. a small increase in 1 ,ns tl . By using 
the first order conditions for the firm, we can derive 
 
 
1
, , ,2 1
, , , , 1
, , ,
/
ˆ 0n ns t n t n tn t n t z n t
n t n t ns t
L l
u l
l
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? .        (19) 
 
Equation (19) means that increased outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality and, 
therefore, reduces welfare in the North. Now, recall from equations (10) and (14) that 
the government in the North may influence 1 ,ns tl  by changing 
1
,n tl , 
2
,n tl  and ,n tK . We can 
derive the following total derivatives; 
 
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
ns t ns t ns t s t
n t n t s t n t
dl l l w
dl l w l
? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?  
 
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
2 2 1 2
, , , ,
ns t ns t ns t s t
n t n t s t n t
dl l l w
dl l w l
? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?  
 
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
1
, , , ,
ns t ns t ns t s t
n t n t s t n t
dl l l w
dK K w K
? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ? . 
Therefore, an increase in 1,n tl , 
2
,n tl  and ,n tK , respectively, affects 
1
,ns tl  via two channels; 
first, a direct effect (measured by equation (10) with 1,s tw  held constant) and, second, an 
indirect effect via 1,s tw  (defined by equation (11)). As the sign below each component 
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indicates, none of these total derivatives can be signed in the general case. To be able to 
relate our results to those presented by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a), we add the 
assumption that the direct effect of 1,n tl , 
2
,n tl  and ,n tK ,  respectively,  dominates  the  
corresponding indirect effect via the foreign wage rate for southern low-skilled labor. 
This assumption is based on the idea that the amount of southern labor used by northern 
firms is small relative to the aggregate hours of work supplied by the low-skilled in the 
South, which means that the behavior of northern firms have a relatively modest effect 
on the wage rate facing the low-skilled in the South. Formally, our assumption is 
summarized as follows; 
 
A1.   
1 1
, ,
1 1
, ,
ns t ns t
n t n t
dl l
sign sign
dl l
?? ? , 
1 1
, ,
2 2
, ,
ns t ns t
n t n t
dl l
sign sign
dl l
?? ?  and 
1 1
, ,
, ,
ns t ns t
n t n t
dl l
sign sign
dK K
?? ? . 
   
The marginal labor income tax rate of the low-ability type can be derived by 
combining equations (A1), (A2) and (4), while the marginal labor income tax rate of the 
high-ability type is derived by combining equations (A4), (A5) and (4). Let 
 , ,,, ,
, ,
/
/
i i
n t n ti t
n z c i i
n t n t
u z
MRS
u c
? ?? ? ?  and 
2 2
, ,2,
, , 2 1
, ,
ˆ ˆ/ˆ
ˆ /
n t n tt
n z c
n t n t
u z
MRS
u c
? ?? ? ?   
denote the marginal rate of substituting between leisure and private consumption for the 
young ability-type i and the young mimicker, respectively. We show in the Appendix 
that the marginal labor income tax rates can be written as 
 
*
, , ,' 1 1 1, 2, 2 1
, , , , , , , , , , ,1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]n t n t n tt tn t n t n t n z c n t n z c n t z n t
n t n t n t n t
n t ns t s t ns t
n t n t n t n t
T w l MRS MRS u l
w w l
dl w l
w dl l w
? ? ?? ?
? ?
?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ???????????
     (20) 
 
1 1 1
, , , , , ,' 2 2 2 1
, , , , , ,2 2 2 2 2 2
, , , , , , ,
ˆ( ) n t n t n t ns t s t ns tn t n t n t n t z n t
n t n t n t n t n t n t n t
dl w l
T w l u l
w l w dl l w
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???????????
.     (21) 
 
In  equation  (20),  the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side  is  due  to  the  self-selection  
constraint and contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type. The intuition is that a higher marginal labor income tax rate makes 
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mimicking less attractive, ceteris paribus, and, therefore, creates room for additional 
redistribution. Also the second term on the right hand side of equation (20) and the 
analogous first term on the right hand side of equation (21) reflect the self-selection 
although for a different reason: changes in 1,n tl  and 
2
,n tl  affect the wage ratio and, 
therefore, the labor that the mimicker needs to supply in order to reach the same income 
as the low-ability type. Normally, we would expect this component to increase the 
marginal labor income tax rate of the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income 
tax rate of the high-ability type. These effects – which would also appear without 
outsourcing - are well understood from earlier research (Stiglitz, 1982). 
 
The final two terms on the right hand side of equation (20) and (21), respectively, 
are due to the appearance of outsourcing; the first arises because a change in the use of 
outsourced labor affects the self-selection constraint, and the second is a budget effect 
due to that the domestic factor income no longer matches domestic output. We will refer 
to the joint effect of these two terms as the direct effect of outsourcing. With assumption 
A1 at our disposal, both these components contribute negatively to the marginal labor 
income tax rate of the low-ability type and positively to the marginal labor income tax 
rate of the high-ability type. The intuition is that an increase (a decrease) in the hours of 
work supplied by the low-ability (high-ability) type leads to less outsourcing, which 
contributes to relax the self-selection constraint and reduce the payment to foreign 
residents. This is analogous to a result derived by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a), yet 
with the modification that the budget effect was absent in their study. The implications 
of outsourcing for the marginal labor income tax structure are summarized as follows; 
 
Proposition 1. In the North, and under assumption A1, the direct effect of 
outsourcing is to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type and increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the high-
ability type. 
 
Proposition 1 is interpretable to mean that the outsourcing contributes to a more 
progressive labor income tax structure in the country that outsources production abroad. 
This policy response causes the level of outsourcing to decrease which, in turn, leads to 
less wage-inequality and reduces the payments to foreign residents. 
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Let us then turn to the marginal capital income tax rates. Define 
 , ,,, ,
, , 1
/
/
i i
n t n ti t
n c x i i
n t n t
u c
MRS
u x ?
? ?? ? ?  and 
2 1
, ,2,
, , 2 1
, , 1
ˆ /ˆ
ˆ /
n t n tt
n c x
n t n t
u c
MRS
u x ?
? ?? ? ?  
to be the marginal rate of substitution between the present and future consumption for 
ability type i and the mimicker, respectively. For the low-ability type, the marginal 
capital income tax rate can be derived by combining equations (A2), (A3), (A7) and (5), 
and for the high-ability type by combining equations (A5), (A6), (A7) and (5). We show 
in the Appendix that the marginal capital income tax rates can be written as 
 
2 2 1
, , , , 1 , 1, , 1 , 1' 1 1, 2,
, 1 , , 1 , , , ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 1
, 1 , , 1
,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
ˆ ˆˆ( ) [ ]
1
n t n t x nt n t z n t n tt t
n t n t n t n c x n c x
n t n t n t n t n t
n t ns t s t
ns t
n t n t n t n t
u u l
r MRS MRS
r r K
dl w
l
r dK r K
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ?
? ?
?? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
???????????????
    (22)
  
2 1 1 1
, 1 , 1, , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,' 2 1
, 1 , , 1 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
ˆ 1( ) n t n t z n t n t n t ns t s tn t n t n t ns t
n t n t n t n t n t n t n t
u l dl w
r l
r K r dK r K
? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
? ??????????????? .                      
                                                                                                                      (23) 
 
The first row on the right hand side of equation (22), and the first term on the right hand 
side of equation (23), reflect motives for capital income taxation that are well 
understood from earlier literature (e.g., Brett 1997; Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001). We 
summarize these incentive effects as follows. If 1, 2,, , , ,ˆ( )
t t
n c x n c xMRS MRS? ? , meaning that 
the low-ability type attaches a higher (lower) relative value to the current consumption 
than the mimicker, there will be an incentive for the government to encourage 
(discourage) early consumption for the low-ability type via a higher (lower) marginal 
capital income tax rate. As such, this incentive effect serves to relax the self-selection 
constraint, as it makes mimicking less attractive. The second term on the right hand side 
of equation (22) and the analogous first term on the right hand side of equation (23) 
appear because a change in the capital stock directly affects the wage ratio and, 
therefore, also the number of work hours that the mimicker needs to supply in order to 
reach the same income as the low-ability type. If  , 1 , 1/ 0( 0)n t n tK? ? ?? ? ? ? , meaning that 
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an increase (a decrease) in the capital stock contributes to relax the self-selection 
constraint, there is an incentive for the government to encourage (discourage) savings 
by implementing lower (higher) marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types 
than it would otherwise have done. 
 
In a way similar to the marginal labor income tax rates discussed above, the final 
two terms in each tax formula are due to the appearance of outsourcing, and their joint 
influence will also in this case be referred as the direct effect of outsourcing. As before, 
the first component reflects that a change in the use of outsourced labor affects the self-
selection constraint, and the second is a budget effect due to that part of the output 
generated by domestic firms are used to pay for foreign labor services. Given 
assumption A1, both these components contribute to increase the marginal capital 
income tax rates. The intuition is that a decrease in the capital stock leads to less 
outsourcing which, in turn, relaxes the self-selection constraint and reduces the 
payments to foreign residents. We have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 2. In the North, and under assumption A1, the direct effect of 
outsourcing is to increase the marginal capital income tax rates for both 
ability-types. 
 
In the North, therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 together imply a distinct modification of 
tax policy by comparison with the standard optimal income tax model: to discourage 
outsourcing, there is an incentive for the government to implement a more progressive 
labor income tax structure and higher marginal capital income tax rates than it would 
otherwise have done. 
 
Note also that the direct effect of outsourcing on the marginal capital income tax 
rate relates to intertermporal production-inefficiency in an interesting way, as it 
contributes to a discrepancy between the ratio of shadow prices of capital, , , 1/n t n t? ? ? , 
and the interest factor, , 11 n tr ?? . This is seen from the first order condition for , 1n tK ? , i.e. 
equation (A7) in the Appendix, which can be written as 
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1 1
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 12 1 1
, 1 , 1, , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
ˆ(1 ) 0n t n t n t s t ns tn t n t z n t ns t n t
n t n t n t n t n t
w dl
r u l l
K K dK
? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? .   (24) 
     
Equation (24) extends a corresponding result derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), 
where the discrepancy between the shadow price ratio and the interest factor was due 
solely to the first term on the right hand side (as the capital stock has a direct effect on 
the domestic wage ratio). Here, two additional effects appear as a consequence of 
outsourcing, which are summarized by the second and third terms on the right hand 
side. The intuition is, of course, that the capital stock in the northern economy in period 
t+1 is directly correlated with the hours of work by southern low-skilled labor 
employed by northern firms, 1 , 1ns tl ? ,  and  the  southern  low-skilled  wage  rate,  
1
, 1s tw ? , in 
period t+1. Both these effects contribute to underprovision of capital relative to the first 
best policy rule. 
 
3.2    Optimal Taxation in the South 
 
The optimal tax problem in the southern economy will be written such that the 
government chooses 1,s tl , 
1
,s tc , 
1
,s tx , 
2
,s tl , 
2
,s tc , 
2
,s tx  and ,s tK  for all t  in order to maximize 
the Lagrangean 
 
 
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
, , , , , , , , , , , , , 1ˆ[ ] [ ]s s s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t ns t s t s t
t t
L W u u F c c x x w l K K? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?  
 
subject to equations (10), (14) and (17). The government in the South treats the 
decision-variables of the northern government as exogenous. The first order conditions 
are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Income taxation in the South is governed by the same general incentives as in the 
North with two important exceptions. First, increased outsourcing leads to less wage 
inequality and, therefore, higher welfare for the South. This is seen by differentiating 
the Lagrangean with respect to 1 ,ns tl  and using the first order conditions for the firm 
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1
, , ,2 1
, , , , 1
, , ,
/
ˆ 0s ns t s t s ts t s t z s t
s t s t ns t
L l
u l
l
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? . 
Second, increased outsourcing leads to more factor income from abroad. In other words, 
and contrary to the government in the North, the southern government has an incentive 
to stimulate outsourcing. 
 
To shorten the notations, and since the components of the tax formulas that are not 
due to the appearance of outsourcing take the same general form as for the northern 
economy, we use 
 
*
, , ,1 1, 2, 2 1
, , , , , , , , ,1 1 1
, , , ,
ˆ ˆ[ ]s t s t s tt ts t s z c s t s z c s t z s t
s t s t s t s t
MRS MRS u l
w w l
? ? ?? ? ?
?? ? ? ?  
, ,2 2 1
, , , ,2 2
, , ,
ˆs t s ts t s t z s t
s t s t s t
u l
w l
? ?? ?
?? ? ?  
to denote the policy rules for marginal labor income taxation that would apply in the 
absence of outsourcing. The policy incentives embedded in these formulas are 
analogous to, and have the same interpretations as, the corresponding effects derived for 
the North above and will, therefore, not be further discussed here. The marginal labor 
income tax rates can then be characterized as follows; 
 
1 1 1 1
, , , , ,' 1 1 1
, , , , 1 1 1 1 1
, , , , ,
( ) s t ns t s t s t ns ts t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t
l w w l
T w l
w w l l w
?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????????
      (25) 
 
1 1 1 1
, , , , ,' 2 2 2
, , , , 2 1 2 2 2
, , , , ,
( ) s t ns t s t s t ns ts t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t
l w w l
T w l
w w l l w
?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????????
.      (26) 
  
The final two terms in each tax formula, the joint influence of which is again 
interpretable as a direct effect of outsourcing, reflect incentives that are in a sense 
opposite to those facing the northern government, as the South (contrary to the North) 
has an incentive to encourage outsourcing. Despite this, and somewhat surprisingly, 
outsourcing affects the marginal labor income tax rates in the southern economy in a 
way that partly resembles the results derived for the North. This is seen from the second 
term on the right hand side of equation (25) and (26), respectively, which provides an 
incentive for the southern government to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for 
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the low-ability-type and increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability 
type, although it does so for a different reason than the one behind the analogous policy 
response in the North. The intuition is, instead, that the southern government can only 
influence the outsourcing indirectly via the wage rate for the low-ability type. An 
increase in the hours of work supplied by the low-ability type leads to a lower before tax 
wage rate for the low-ability type which, in turn, leads to increased outsourcing, i.e. 1 ,ns tl  
increases. A decrease in the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type also leads to 
a lower before tax wage rate for the low-ability type (as the two types of labor are 
complements in terms of the production function) and, therefore, to increased 
outsourcing. As indicated above, the reason as to why increased outsourcing is desirable 
in the South is that it relaxes the self-selection constraint. 
 
However,  the  budget  effect  (the  third  term  on  the  right  hand  side)  works  in  the  
opposite direction here, as a decrease in the before tax wage rate of the low-ability type 
reduces the factor income from abroad. Therefore, the budget effect counteracts the 
incentive to relax the self-selection constraint and implies, instead, an incentive for the 
government in the South to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type and decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type. 
 
We have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 3. (i) Increased outsourcing leads to less wage inequality for 
the southern economy and contributes, therefore, to relax the self-selection 
constraint. This provides an incentive for the government in the South to 
implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type 
and a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type than 
it would otherwise have done. (ii) Reduced hours of work by the low-
ability type and increased hours of work by the high-ability type contribute 
to increase the budgetary gain of outsourcing for the southern economy, 
which provides an incentive for the government in the South to implement 
a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and a 
lower marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type than it 
would otherwise have done. 
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Therefore, and contrary to the results derived for the northern economy, the two terms 
comprising the direct effect of outsourcing in each tax formula work in opposite 
directions here. The relative size of these components determines whether outsourcing 
motivates higher or lower marginal labor income tax rates than in the standard optimal 
income tax model without outsourcing. 
 
Turning to capital income taxation, we use 1, 1s t? ?  and 2, 1s t? ? , respectively, as a 
short notation for the marginal capital income tax formula that would apply in the 
absence of outsourcing, i.e. the marginal capital income tax rate in the standard two-
type model. We have 
2 2 1
, , , , 1 , 1, , 1 , 11 1, 2,
, 1 , , , ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
ˆ ˆˆ[ ]s t s t x s t s t z s t s tt ts t s c x s c x
s t s t s t s t s t
u u l
MRS MRS
r r K
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?? ? ? ?  
2 1
, 1 , 1, , 1 , 12
, 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
ˆs t s t z s t s t
s t
s t s t s t
u l
r K
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?
?? ? ?  
which are analogous to their counterparts for the northern economy analyzed above and 
will not be further discussed here. We can then write the marginal capital income tax 
rates in the South as follows; 
 
1 1 1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1' 1
, 1 , , 1 , 1 , 11
, 1 , 1, , 1 , 1 , 1
1( ) s t ns t s t s ti is t s t n t s t ns t
s t s t s t s t n t
l w w
r l
r w K r K
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ??????????????????
  for 1, 2i ? .            (27) 
                                                                                                           
 
By  analogy  to  the  effects  of  outsourcing  on  the  marginal  labor  income  tax  rates,  
outsourcing gives rise to two counteracting effects on the marginal capital income tax 
rate. First, a decrease in the capital stock leads to a lower pre-tax wage rate for the low-
ability type which, in turn, leads to increased outsourcing. This effect is summarized by 
the second term on the right hand side of equation (27) and provides an incentive for the 
government to increase the marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types. The 
intuition is that increased outsourcing leads to a relaxation of the self-selection 
constraint and, therefore, increased welfare in the southern economy. Second, the lower 
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before tax wage rate following a decrease in the capital stock reduces the factor income 
from abroad, which implies a welfare loss for the southern economy. To avoid this 
welfare loss, there is an incentive for the government to implement lower marginal 
capital income tax rates, which explains the final term on the right hand side of the tax 
formula. Note also that, if we were to derive a counterpart to equation (24) for the 
southern economy, we may also in this case interpret the direct effect of outsourcing in 
each capital tax formula as a consequence of intertemporal production-inefficiency at 
the second best optimum. 
 
We summarize the effects of outsourcing on the marginal capital income tax rates by the 
following proposition; 
 
Proposition 4. (i) A decrease in the capital stock leads to a lower pre-tax 
wage rate for the low-ability type, ceteris paribus, which contributes to 
increased outsourcing and, therefore, a relaxation of the self-selection 
constraint. This provides an incentive for the government in the South to 
implement higher marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types 
than it would otherwise have done. (ii) An increase in the capital stock 
leads to a higher pre-tax wage rate for the low-ability type and, therefore, 
to increased factor income from the North. This provides an incentive for 
the government in the South to implement lower marginal capital income 
tax rates for both ability-types. 
 
Propositions 3 and 4 describe two counteracting mechanisms via which 
outsourcing affects the income tax structure in the South. Note also that the size of the 
budget effect (discussed in the second part of each proposition) depends on the number 
of labor hours that the northern firms outsource to the South, 1 ,ns tl . Therefore, the 
following result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 3 and 4; 
 
Corollary 1. If the size of outsourced labor, 1 ,ns tl , is small enough to imply 
1
, 1
, ,1
,
0ns ts t ns t
s t
l
l
w
?? ? ?? , 
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then the direct effects of outsourcing on the southern tax structure in 
period t will be to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-
ability type, increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-
ability type and increase the marginal capital income tax rates. If, on the 
other hand, 1 ,ns tl  is large enough to imply 
 
1
, 1
, ,1
,
0ns ts t ns t
s t
l
l
w
?? ? ?? , 
then the direct effect of outsourcing on the southern tax structure in period 
t will be to increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability 
type, decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type 
and decrease the marginal capital income tax rates. 
 
The corollary means that the qualitative policy response to outsourcing is related to the 
level of outsourcing. As long as the level of outsourcing is low, the government in the 
South will respond to outsourcing by increased labor income tax progression and higher 
marginal  capital  income  tax  rates,  i.e.,  adjust  the  tax  structure  in  the  same  qualitative  
way as the Northern government. However, if the level of outsourcing increases over 
time (if, e.g., the outsourcing cost of the North decreases over time for some reason), we 
may eventually reach a point where the government in the south responds by 
implementing a less progressive labor income tax and lower marginal capital income tax 
rates than it would have done, had outsourcing not been an option for firms in the North. 
In this case, where the level of outsourcing is relatively high, the optimal policy 
response by the southern government will be qualitatively the opposite from that of its 
northern counterpart. 
 
4. Policy Cooperation 
 
In Section 3, we analyzed a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each country 
implements its own tax policy and treats the tax policy decided upon by the other 
national government as exogenous. Since the policy implemented by either country 
affects the well-being of the residents in the other country as well, the noncooperative 
equilibrium is not efficient from the perspective of society as a whole. Therefore, policy 
cooperation (if designed appropriately) will lead to higher welfare. 
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There are several possible approaches to address policy cooperation; the most 
common in earlier theoretical literature is probably to assume that the resource 
allocation is decided upon by a social planner, whose objective is to maximize welfare 
for society as a whole subject to all resources available. However, this approach is not 
particularly realistic from the perspective of real world public policy. It is, instead, 
much more  realistic  to  assume that  the  countries  agree  upon reforms,  the  purposes  of  
which are to improve the resource allocation by comparison with the initial equilibrium. 
We will follow the latter approach here by considering two policy reforms designed to 
target  work  hours  and  capital  formation,  respectively.  In  each  such  reform,  the  
noncooperative Nash equilibrium is treated as the initial, prereform, equilibrium. 
 
Suppose that policy cooperation is governed by a utilitarian objective 
 
 n sW W W? ?         (28) 
 
in which we give equal weight to the national welfare functions. By recalling that the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium means that each national government has made an 
optimal policy choice conditional on the policies chosen by the other country, one can 
derive the following global welfare effects following changes in the hours of work; 
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, , , ,
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.      (29d) 
 
The intuition behind equations (29) is straight forward. As each national government 
has already made an optimal choice of work hours at the national level via the labor 
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income tax, a small increase in the hours of work does not affect the domestic welfare; 
it only affects welfare in the other country via the (uninternalized) externalities that 
outsourcing give rise to. The signs of equations (29a) and (29b) follow from assumption 
A1 in subsection 3.1. In addition, note that (by the Envelope Theorem) 
 
, ,
0i i
j t j t
W W
c x
? ?? ?? ?  for 1, 2i ? , and ,j n s? , 
in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, since private consumption does not give rise to 
international externalities. As a consequence, any change in private consumption 
induced by a change in the hours of work has no first order welfare effect. 
 
Let us start with coordinated changes in the hours of work. With equations (28) 
and (29) at our disposal, it is straight forward to derive the following result; 
 
Proposition 5. (i) Under assumption A1, a small decrease in the hours of 
work supplied by the northern low-ability type accompanied by a small 
increase in the hours of work supplied by the northern high-ability type 
leads to higher welfare in the South. (ii) If 
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l
w
?? ? ??  ( 0? ), 
then a small decrease (increase) in the hours of work supplied by the 
southern low-ability type accompanied by a small increase (decrease) in 
the hours of hours work supplied by the southern high-ability type leads to 
higher welfare in the North. 
 
Proposition 5 suggests that a coordinated change in the labor and capital income taxes 
can be designed to give higher welfare in both countries. The government is the North 
may implement the labor supply adjustment indicated by the first part of the proposition 
via increased marginal labor income taxation for the low-ability type and decreased 
marginal labor income taxation for the high-ability type, i.e. in a sense reduce the 
degree of labor tax progression, while at the same time changing the average labor 
income tax rates and the capital income tax in order to retain budget balance and adjust 
the capital stock to its original equilibrium path. For the government is the South, the 
problem is analogous, except that it should either increase the marginal labor income tax 
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rate for the low-ability type and decrease it for the high-ability type, or decrease the 
marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and increase it for the high-
ability type, depending on whether 1 1 1, , , ,( / )n t ns t s t ns tl w l? ? ? ?  is positive or negative. 
 
Finally, we analyze the welfare effects of a coordinated change in the capital 
stock. By differentiating equation (28) with respect to ,n tK  and ,s tK , respectively, and 
evaluating the resulting derivative in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, we have 
(again by the Envelope Theorem) 
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.      (30b) 
 
Equations (30a) and (30b) imply the following result; 
 
Proposition 6. (i) Under assumption A1, a small increase in the northern 
capital stock leads to higher welfare in the South. (ii) If 
 
1
, 1
, ,1
,
0ns tn t ns t
s t
l
l
w
?? ? ??  ( 0? ), 
a small increase (decrease) in the southern capital stock leads to higher 
welfare in the North. 
  
A coordinated policy reform with the effects presented in Proposition 6 also requires a 
combined change in the labor and capital income taxes. The government in the North 
may  implement  the  first  part  of  the  proposition  by  decreasing  the  marginal  capital  
income tax rates, while changing the average capital income tax rates and the labor 
income  tax  to  retain  budget  balance  as  well  as  adjust  the  hours  of  work  along  the  
original equilibrium path. For the government in the South, the decision is analogous, 
except that it should either decrease or increase the marginal capital income tax rates 
depending on whether 1 1 1, , , ,( / )n t ns t s t ns tl w l? ? ? ?  is positive or negative. 
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5. Summary and Discussion 
 
Outsourcing has so far received surprisingly little attention in the literature on optimal 
income taxation. The present paper attempts to fill (part of) this gap by analyzing 
optimal labor income and capital income taxation in an OLG economy comprising two 
countries, where one of them (referred to as North) locates part of its low-skill 
production activities in the other (referred to as South). Each country is characterized by 
two ability-types and asymmetric information between the government and the private 
sector. Based on this framework, we analyze the tax policies implemented by each 
country in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each national government treats 
the  tax  policy  of  the  other  country  as  exogenous,  as  well  as  policy  coordination  
targeting the hours of work and capital formation, respectively. 
 
Our results show that outsourcing by domestic firms provides an incentive for the 
government in the North to implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the 
low-ability type and a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type, 
i.e. in this sense a more progressive labor income tax structure, and higher marginal 
capital income tax rates for both ability-types than it would otherwise have done. The 
intuition is that reduced outsourcing – a consequence of this policy response – leads to a 
more equal wage distribution in the North, which relaxes the self-selection constraint. In 
addition, reduced outsourcing contributes to lower the southern wage rate for low-
skilled labor, meaning that less factor income is transferred to the southern economy. In 
the South, which receives foreign production structure and employment opportunities 
for its own labor force from abroad, outsourcing gives rise to two counteracting 
incentives. First, increased outsourcing leads to less wage inequality in the South, which 
constitutes an incentive for the southern government to implement a lower marginal 
labor income tax for the low-ability type, a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the 
high-ability type and higher marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types than 
it would otherwise have done. The intuition is that these policy responses contribute to 
relax the self-selection constraint. Second, a decrease in the wage rate paid to low-
skilled labor in the South also means less factor income from the North; a budget effect 
which calls for policy responses opposite to those just described. Therefore, the 
responses to outsourcing in terms of marginal income taxation by the southern 
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government are, in general, ambiguous: if the level of outsourcing is sufficiently small 
(large), then the self-selection effect dominates (is dominated by) the budget effect in 
terms how the southern government responds to outsourcing. 
 
With  the  noncooperative  Nash  equilibrium  as  our  reference  case,  we  also  show  
that policy coordination leading to a decrease in the hours of work supplied by the 
northern low-ability type, an increase in the hours of work supplied by the northern 
high-ability type and an increase in the northern capital stock, respectively, is welfare 
improving for the South. The corresponding changes in work hours and capital 
formation that the South ought to implement depends on how the welfare in the northern 
economy changes in response to an increase in the wage rate paid to low-skilled labor in 
the South. 
 
Future research might take several new directions, and we briefly discuss two of 
them. First, we have completely neglected the role of non-competitive wage formation. 
If the North is thought of as a European economy, it would clearly be relevant to allow 
trade-unions to affect wage formation for low-skilled workers and, as a consequence, 
allow for equilibrium unemployment among the low-skilled in the North. 11 As  trade-
unions (most likely) attempt to push up the wage rate above the competitive level, there 
might be an even stronger incentive for firms in the North to outsource production 
capacity to the South. Therefore, non-competitive wage formation is important both for 
the public policy implemented by the national government and for the welfare effects of 
policy cooperation. Second, to be able to compare our results with those of the standard 
optimal income model, allowing us to capture the effects of outsourcing in the simplest 
possible way, we have disregarded other possible sources of interaction between the 
countries (e.g., factor mobility12 and final goods trade). Such an extension is clearly 
relevant  here;  for  instance,  labor  mobility  from the  South  to  the  North  (due  to  higher  
wages in the North) may, to some extent, offset the incentives for outsourcing. It may 
                                               
11  Such an extension may also include product market imperfections. There is a growing literature 
dealing with relationships between non-competitive wage formation, product market 
imperfections, globalization and outsourcing, although so far with a focus on issues other than 
redistribution via optimal income taxation. See, e.g., Naylor (1998, 1999), Lommerud et al. (2003) 
and Lommerud et al. (2009). 
12       Aloi et al. (2009) have studied the effects of international integration of capital markets in the case 
when countries differ in their labor market institutions, i.e. one country has a perfectly competitive 
labor market while the other is unionized. But they have abstracted from considering 
unemployment in the country where labor market is unionized.  
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also necessitate policy adjustments other than those described above. We leave these 
and other extensions for future research. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
The North 
 
The first order conditions for 1,n tl , 
1
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To derive the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type, combine equations 
(A1) and (A2) to 
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By using 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1, , , , , , , , ,/ ( )n t n t z n t c n t n t n t n tw u u w T w l? ?  from equation (4), substituting into equation 
(A8) and rearranging, we obtain equation (20). The marginal labor income tax rate of 
the high-ability type can be derived in the same general way by combining equations 
(A4), (A5) and (4). 
 
The marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type can be derived by 
combining equations (A2) and (A3), which gives 
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Next, solve equation (A7) for ,n t?  and substitute into equation (A9). Finally, by using 
1 1 ' 1
, 1 , , , , , 1 , 1 , , 11 / ( )n t n t c n t x n t n t n t n tr u u r r?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? , substituting into equation (A9) and 
rearranging, we obtain (22). The marginal capital income tax rate of the high-ability 
type can be derived in the same general way by combining equations (A5), (A6), (A7) 
and (5). 
 
The South 
 
The first order conditions for 1,s tl , 
1
,s tc , 
1
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2
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, 1s tx ?  and , 1s tK ? , respectively, can 
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The marginal labor income tax rates and marginal capital income tax rates can be 
derived in the same general way as they were derived for the North. 
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